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CIKKEK, TANULMÁNYOK
WHAT QUALITIES DO GOVERNMENT-OWNED VENTURE CAPITAL 
INVESTORS SEEK IN A NEW VENTURE? – A COMPARISON OF 
INVESTMENT CRITERIA ACROSS PRE-SEED, SEED, AND EXPANSION 
STAGE STARTUPS
MILYEN TULAJDONSÁGOKAT KERESNEK AZ ÁLLAMI TULAJDONÚ 
KOCKÁZATI TŐKEBEFEKTETŐK EGY ÚJ VÁLLALKOZÁSBAN? – 
A BEFEKTETÉSI KRITÉRIUMOK ÖSSZEHASONLÍTÁSA INKUBÁCIÓS, 
MAGVETŐ ÉS NÖVEKEDÉSI SZAKASZÚ INDULÓ VÁLLALKOZÁSOK 
TEKINTETÉBEN
ENDRE MIHÁLY MOLNÁR - ERIKA JÁKI
Private venture capital (VC) investors usually do not invest in early life-cycle stage startups such as seed and pre-seed 
companies, since investment size typically doesn’t reach investment thresholds. The entry of governments with fund 
managers to venture capital markets presents seed and pre-seed companies with the opportunity to receive funding. This 
paper examines the main investment preferences of Hungarian government-owned venture capital investors regarding 
pre-seed, seed, and expansion stage startups. Verbal protocol analysis enabled examination of the screening process in 
real-time in all three life-cycle stages. It is found that governmental VC funds mostly value financial indicators followed 
by market-related qualities while private VCs value these characteristics in alternate formation. However, in the pre-seed 
stage, the financial acumen and capabilities of management teams form the main criteria in similarity to angel investors. 
Governmental VCs also greatly seek innovational value in target firms. 
 
Keywords: venture capital, governmental venture capital, seed investment, investment criteria, startup financing, 
business plan
A magánpiaci kockázati tőkebefektetők jellemzően nem fektetnek be olyan korai fázisú induló vállalkozásokba, mint 
a magvető és inkubációs fázisú cégek, mivel a befektetési nagyság nem éri el a küszöbértéket. Az állam belépése a 
kockázati tőkepiacra a saját alapkezelőivel lehetőséget nyújtott magvető és inkubációs fázisú cégeknek a finanszírozású 
megszerzésére. Ez a cikk a magyar állami tulajdonú kockázatitőke-befektetők főbb befektetési preferenciáit elemzi 
az inkubáiós, magvető és növekedési fázisú induló vállalkozások tekintetében. A szerzők a verbal protocol elemzés 
segítségével képesek voltak valós időben adatokat gyűjteni a befektetések szűrési folyamatáról mindhárom fejlettségi 
életszakaszban. Azt találták, hogy az állami kockázati tőkés a pénzügyi és célpiaccal kapcsolatos tulajdonságokat értékeli 
a legtöbbre, pont fordítva a magánpiaci kockázati tőkésekhez képest. Az inkubációs szakaszban viszont a pénzügyi és 
menedzsmenttulajdonságok a legfontosabbak nekik, mint ahogy az üzleti angyaloknak is. Az állami kockázati tőkések 
továbbá nagy hangsúlyt fektetnek a céltársaságok innovációs értékére.  
Kulcsszavak: kockázati tőke, állami kockázati tőke, magvető befektetés, befektetési kritérium, startup finanszírozású, 
üzleti terv
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Investment preferences of venture capital investors have drawn substantial attention from researchers (for 
example, Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984; Macmillan et al., 1987; 
Robinson, 1987; Khan, 1987; Sandberg & Hofer, 1987; 
Hall & Hofer, 1993; Zacharakis & Meyer, 1995; Muzyka 
et al., 1996; Zacharakis & Meyer, 1998; Shepherd, 1999; 
Mason & Stark, 2004; Zacharakis & Shepherd, 2005; 
Hsu et al., 2014). This interest was largely initiated by 
findings of Dorsey (1979), and Bruno and Tyebjee (1983), 
demonstrating that VCs are especially adept at choosing 
investments. Evolution of this research field followed a 
methodological path and dissection of the VC investment 
process with individual papers focusing on investment 
preferences in particular phases of the process. The 
literature in its current state tends to focus solely on 
the investment preferences of private VCs. This is not 
problematic in western economies where the majority 
of early-stage investments come from private actors. 
Currently however, such investments are primarily made 
by government-sponsored actors in the CEE (Central and 
Eastern Europe) region (Karsai, 2018; Jáki & Molnár, 2017; 
Daszyńska-Żygadło et al., 2016, Jáki & Molnár, 2021). 
Governmental venture capitalists (GVCs) may have 
different preferences when choosing investments compared 
to private venture capitalists (PVCs). There are differences 
between  actors concerning their investment approaches, 
including the target rate of return, motivation behind the 
investment, and ownership of managed funds. Currently, 
international literature lacks studies which investigate the 
investment preferences of GVC investors using reliable real-
time methods and not just in regard to self-reporting by agents. 
Hence startup entrepreneurs in the CEE region typically need 
information on preferences of GVCs to become funded. This 
paper therefore aims to redress this balance. 
In the CEE region, venture capital investment suffered 
setbacks following the 2008 financial crisis, but VC 
investments are currently increasing (see Figure 1). The 
structure of investment has also changed: the volume of 
seed investment increased from 4-5 million € annually 
between 2007-2012 period to 38 million € in 2018. The 
whole sector still has not re-attained the peak of 2008 
in terms of investment volume but aided by EU venture 
capital programs, it is currently following a recovery 
trajectory.
Within the CEE region, Hungary presents a valuable 
setting to study this topic since venture capital investment 
volume was the highest in the region in 2018 (Invest 
Europe, 2019). Government policy in Hungary places 
significant emphasis on the development of the Hungarian 
startup ecosystem. This clear focus has been observed 
since the start of the Joint European Resources for Micro 
to Medium Enterprises (JEREMIE) program, which was a 
venture capital program financed by the European Union. 
Hungary participated in the program between 2009 and 
2016, using obtained funds to stimulate the stagnant PVC 
market. PVC fund managers were selected to manage 
mostly state-provided sources in the framework of the 
program through hybrid funds and indirect involvement. 
In terms of investment volume the effort was successful 
as during the course of the program, venture capital 
investment increased dramatically in Hungary compared 
with previous years (see Figure 2). 
Figure 1.
Venture capital investment volume in the CEE 
region between 2007 and 2018 in million EUR across 
different life-cycle stages
Source: Invest Europe (2019)
Figure 2.
Venture capital investment volume in Hungary 
between 2007 and 2018 in thousand EUR across 
different life-cycle stages
Source: Invest Europe (2017); Invest Europe (2019)
Other effects of the program are subject to debate in 
the literature (for example, Becsky-Nagy & Fazekas, 
2015; Jáki et al., 2017; Karsai, 2018; Lovas & Illés, 2018; 
Berlinger, 2019; Kállay & Jáki, 2019).
One aim of the JEREMIE program was that of regional 
development with participating fund managers intending 
to invest in peripheral regions of Hungary. However in 
reality they tended to invest in companies headquartered 
in a peripheral region, but with actual operations taking 
place in the capital city. Additionally, almost all of the 
fund managers acquired majority shares in the target 
companies which can reduce the long-term motivation of 
founding members (Lovas & Illés, 2018). When analyzing 
data of firms receiving investment from JEREMIE 
funds, Fazekas and Becsky-Nagy (2019) found a negative 
relationship between firm growth and the equity share of 
VC in the firm. Furthermore, Fazekas (2018) found that 
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companies receiving funding directly from GVC funds 
performed better than those which received funding from 
JEREMIE sources thus indicating that private investor’s 
motivation does not necessarily lead to improved company 
performance. In a later article (Fazekas & Becsky-Nagy, 
2020), it is concluded that generally moral hazard may 
lead to poorer results of hybrid GVC-PVC investments 
compared to pure GVC investments.
 Karsai (2017) suggested there is a range of best 
practices which governments of developed countries 
already learnt and acquired through the evolution of 
governmental VC programs, and that such best practices 
should be implemented in future domestic VC programs 
by CEE countries. Primarily, the duration of the program 
should be sufficiently short to influence the market as 
little as possible, bureaucratic requirements should be 
minimized, and data should be collected during the 
program to perform a final complete evaluation. 
From 2016 the government continued to support 
development of the startup ecosystem by shifting focus 
away from hybrid funds and by directly investing state 
resources through state-owned fund managers as direct 
involvement. In initial stages of seeking startup financing 
(namely seed and pre-seed capital), companies can 
usually not depend on PVC financing, since investment 
sums are so small it is not economical for PVC providers 
to commit to funding. However, GVC fund managers 
tend to offer possibilities for very early-stage companies 
to receive initially small investments with the possibility 
of a follow-up round. Additionally, GVC investors can 
only acquire minority shares in target companies, which 
helps founders to be motivated in the longer term.  In 
this regard, GVC can be regarded as complementary to 
PVC in Hungary. As can be observed in Figure 1, the 
overall investment volume started to increase again in 
2017, and in 2018 reached its highest point in the decade 
which is in large part due to direct investment. Moreover, 
alternative sources of early-stage investments are also 
becoming more widespread, including investment from 
angel investors, incubators, accelerators, crowdfunding, 
or seed funds connected to corporations and universities 
(Karsai, 2019).
Startup companies face problems when applying for 
GVC financing in the earlier life-cycle stages such as pre-
seed and seed investment. The literature tends to only 
deal with the preferences of traditional PVC investors 
which tend not to invest in early stage startup companies 
due to prominent market failures such as information 
asymmetries and transaction costs (Colombo et al., 2016; 
Lovas, 2015), hence there is a lack of VC investment 
preference research in such early phases. The question 
therefore arises as to how startup firms can predict 
investment preferences of VC investors in early-stage 
investments by studying literature on angel investment 
preferences. In general, this is not possible as the literature 
tends to indicate fundamental differences in the selection 
criteria of angel and VC investors due to different 
professional backgrounds, portfolio size, and approaches 
to dealing with risk (Hsu et al., 2014; Mason & Stark, 
2004). This paper further aims to also solve this problem 
in order to assist startup companies in receiving a better 
understanding of qualities GVC investors seek in ventures 
in various life-cycle stages.
Literature Review  
of Investment Preferences studies
Investment preferences of venture capital investors have 
been examined by researchers from the early 1980s, 
originating in the USA by use of a variety of methods. 
With ongoing evolution in research methodology, the 
earliest papers mainly used questionnaire and interview 
instruments to find out more about how VCs select target 
companies. 
Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) used structured interviews 
and questionnaires to identify five common factors 
behind VC investment decisions as follows: (1) Market 
Attractiveness, (2) Product Differentiation, (3) Managerial 
Capabilities, (4) Environmental Threat Resistance. This 
work laid the foundation for further studies by acting as 
a vanguard in discovering the main influential factors. 
Macmillan et al. (1987) aimed to validate results with a 
larger sample of VCs and found that the most important 
investment factor was in the consistent capabilities of 
management, as in “irrespective of the horse (product), 
horse race (market), or odds (financial criteria) it is the 
jockey (entrepreneur) who fundamentally determines 
whether the venture capitalist will place a bet at all” 
(Macmillan et al., 1987, p. 10).  This observation is 
corroborated by Robinson (1987) who suggests that 
management teams need to be complete and must have 
acquired business skills through experience.  Robinson 
(1987) also emphasizes the importance of the balance 
between technical skills needed for the production or 
provision of the service, entrepreneurial experience of 
key players, and requirements of the specific market. 
Khan (1987) used a decision-making model to estimate 
the impact of VC decisions on realized returns and found 
that creativity and resourcefulness of the entrepreneur in 
addition to the ability to enter new markets innovatively 
is the most significant determinant of realized profits on 
the investment. Dávid and Becsky-Nagy (2016) conducted 
a questionnaire to assess investment preferences of 
Hungarian VC providers who mostly indicated they prefer 
the capability of an investment to generate a return over any 
other given characteristic of an investment opportunity. 
All the previously mentioned papers used 
questionnaires and interviews as the main data collection 
method. However, Sandberg and Hofer (1987) warned 
against the use of questionnaires in studies on VC 
investment preferences in that it was felt the decision-
making process might be falsely simplified by such 
means. It was further suggested researchers use real-time 
methods, such as observation and verbal protocol as data 
gathering techniques to study this field. Subsequently, 
Zacharakis and Meyer (1998) indicated that methods such 
as questionnaires and interviews used in earlier works 
are most likely biased due to individuals being prone to 
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remember their experiences and preferences in a distorted 
manner through recall bias. Furthermore, respondents 
may try to justify their previous actions after the event 
in post hoc rationalization. Hence it may be extremely 
difficult for VC fund managers to become introspective 
about their own decision-making processes. 
This gave rise to the use of verbal protocols as a 
real-time method based on observing VCs during the 
investment assessment process. Hall and Hofer (1993) 
conducted 16 verbal protocols with VCs by observing 
and recording how they evaluated startup investment 
proposals. They found that VCs tended to only read 
documents until they discovered a critical fault, thus 
resulting in immediate rejection. They also concluded 
that in the pre-screening phase VCs most valued the 
quality of the proposal and investor fit. In second-round 
funding assessments however VCs most valued startups 
recommendations from partners. Zacharakis and Meyer 
(1995) also used the verbal protocol analysis approach 
by involving two VC firms which had to partly evaluate 
their prior investment proposals, and partly evaluate 
those provided by researchers. It was found that VCs 
most valued innovative qualities of the startup’s products 
or services. The study also concluded these must be 
introduced as early as possible in the business plan. Mason 
and Stark (2004) however not only studied VC investment 
preferences, but compared the investment preferences of 
business angels, bankers, and VCs using verbal protocol 
analysis. The study found that VCs mostly valued market 
growth potential, market demand, the presence of entry 
barriers, and the financial indicators of startups such 
as financial ratios, company value, and expected return 
on exit. However, quality of the management team was 
not found to be of much importance for VCs to thereby 
contradict the findings of the questionnaire-based studies 
of the 1980s. Analysis in this present paper builds on the 
preference comparison approach used by Mason and Stark 
(2004). There have also been other applications of verbal 
protocol analysis in the study of investment decision 
making processes in the early stage angel investor 
segment (for example, Smith et al., 2010; Harrison et al., 
2015; Mason & Botelho, 2016). 
Apart from verbal protocol analysis, a research 
method which became favored by VC investment 
decision researchers is that of conjoint analysis. This 
involves researchers posing a series of investment 
decision-pair choices to VCs which differ in terms of 
various pre-defined qualities, and tVCs are asked to 
select between them. Results are statistically analyzed 
to detect the main factors behind investment decisions. 
This method also provides a solution to the recall bias 
and post hoc rationalization problems, but gathered data 
tends to be less information-rich than data collected by 
verbal protocol analysis. Muzyka et al. (1996) conducted 
a conjoint analysis study using data collected from 
European VC managers who had to choose between 53 
paired investment opportunities. They found leadership 
capabilities, experience, sales skills of the management 
team and sustainability of market share to be the most 
sought-after qualities by VCs.  Shepherd (1999) also 
used conjoint analysis on data collected from Australian 
VC managers and found the industry experience and 
education of the management team and the strength of 
the competitors to be the most relevant factors. In their 
conjoint analysis study, Zacharakis and Shepherd (2005) 
found the same factors to be strong in addition to product 
differentiation and market growth potential. Finally, by 
use of conjoint analysis Hsu et al. (2014) found that angel 
investors place more emphasis on strategic readiness and 
affective passion than VC managers who prefer economic 
potential. 
Research goals
This study examines the investment preferences of GVC 
investors in general and particularly in pre-seed, seed, and 
expansion stage investment phases using the real-time 
research method of verbal protocol analysis. It therefore 
provides a much-needed extension to the current literature 
on VC investment preferences by aiming to answer the 
following research question: what qualities do GVC 
investors value in target companies in various life-cycle 
stages?
It is intended to explore the qualities GVC investors 
will value overall and it is expected that GVC investors 
tend to mimic investment preferences of PVC investors. 
Based on the literature, this leads to an expectation for 
GVC investors to value market characteristics the most, 
followed by that of financial indicators (Zacharakis & 
Shepherd, 2005; Mason & Stark, 2004; Shepherd, 1999). 
H1a: Overall, GVC investors value the market the 
most followed by financial indicators of target com-
panies.
Additionally, by using EU funds the Hungarian 
government launched the GINOP program as part of the 
2014-2020 programming period with the explicit aim of 
developing the innovational capabilities of the economy 
(Palyazat.gov.hu, 2014). Many of the subprograms include 
investment into GVC funds, leading to an assumption 
that in overall terms GVC investors highly value the 
innovational quality of the product or service of a target 
company. 
H1b: Overall GVC investors value the innovational 
value of the product highly within the product/ser-
vice category.
It is also expected to observe variations in the results of the 
three investment phases. In the pre-seed phase a suitable 
indicator of the GVC investor’s preferences may be that 
of criteria used by angel investors, who tend to invest in 
the earliest life-cycle stages of startup companies. Angel 
investors are highly influenced by the personal qualities 
of entrepreneurs in their investment decisions because the 
problem of information asymmetries is very prevalent in 
the pre-seed phase (Hsu et al., 2014). It is expected that 
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management teams form the most important consideration 
in the early investment stages, given literature suggests that 
in these stages investors mainly base their decisions on the 
quality of management. This may be due to relatively little 
information available on the history of companies, thus it is 
generally hard to rely on financial data or projections (Hsu 
et al., 2014). Additionally, business plans formed in these 
stages are not necessarily very precise, since the product or 
service of the company is typically not finalized, leading 
to investors not placing strong emphasis on the quality of 
the business plan. Thus a hypothesis is formed that if the 
GVC faces similar problems in the pre-seed investment 
phase as angel investors, then it will follow a similar 
preference structure by placing the highest importance on 
management of the target company and less importance 
on the business plan and financial indicators.
H2a: In the pre-seed phase, the management of the 
target company is among the most valued charac-
teristics by the GVC investor.
H2b.: In the pre-seed phase, the financial indicators 
of the company are among the least valued charac-
teristics by the GVC investor.
H2c: In the pre-seed phase, the business plan of the 
company is among the least valued characteristics 
by the GVC investor.
Traditional VC investors tend not to invest in pre-seed 
companies due to the high transaction cost of investing 
and the lack of economies of scale in small investments. 
Thus they tend to prefer more developed startups which 
require larger investments. Thus in the seed and expansion 
stages, it is expected for GVC investors to invest according 
to the preference of PVC investors.  There may however be 
a slight difference in that while PVC investors tend not to 
highly value the quality of business plans (Zacharakis & 
Shepherd, 2005; Mason & Stark, 2004; Shepherd, 1999), 
it is expected GVC investors may value them to a stronger 
degree.  Furthermore, it is known that VCs connected to the 
government are subject to increased levels of bureaucracy 
(Karsai, 2017), an aspect which could be manifested in 
increased attention to the business plan structure as the 
basis for further record-keeping.  
H3a: In the seed phase, the GVC investor values the 
market the most followed by the financial indicators 
of the target company.
H3b: In the seed phase, the GVC investor values the 
business plan of the target company among the top 
three characteristics.
H4a: In the expansion phase, the GVC investor va-
lues the market the most followed by the financial 
indicators of the target company.
H4b: In the expansion phase, the GVC investor va-
lues the business plan of the target company among 
the top three characteristics.
Differences between GVC and PVC investors in terms of 
industry focus, the goal of the investment, and regulation 
of the investment selection process may influence the final 
result. The implications of this study should help startups 
in assessing their readiness to approach GVC investors 
according to the current life-cycle stage of ventures and 
should also enable policy-makers to receive experience-
based feedback on the realization of governmental 
investments.
Methodology
In this chapter, the sample base, data collection and 
analysis techniques are discussed.
Sample
The sample was collected in spring 2018 and consisted 
of three Hungarian GVC investment managers investing 
in pre-seed startups, three investing in seed startups, 
and three investing in expansion-stage startups, 
totaling nine GVC investment managers. They were 
identified with the help of an inside expert through 
expert sampling who was asked to suggest managers 
from each life-cycle specialization stage for the best 
representation in terms of demographic characteristics 
(Horváth & Mitev, 2015). A random sample would have 
been ideal for purposes of this study, however due to 
lack of information on the GVC sector it is generally 
not possible. Reputation-based sampling is widely 
regarded as the second-best option for generalizability. 
The investment managers were male, middle-aged and 
in possession of a business or finance master’s degree. 
All were required to be proficient with business plans 
and company valuation. Based on interviews with 
other venture capital managers these demographic 
characteristics can be also generally observed at PVC 
firms, hence they are unlikely to be the source of 
different outcomes. 
Pre-seed GVC investors tend to target startups with little 
information and provide a modest amount of investment. 
Seed GVC investors target startups that already started 
developing a prototype and gathering market feedback, thus 
generally providing higher investment levels. Expansion-
stage GVC investors tend to target established startups, 
which have already completed prototype development and 
have sufficient market feedback to provide a substantial 
amount of investment. One aim of this study is to indicate 
how GVC investment preferences differ between the three 
types of GVC investors and across the different life-cycle 
stages.
Each verbal protocol interview took place over one 
hour during which two verbal protocol exercises were 
successfully completed. This resulted in 18 verbal 
protocol transcripts to work with. Very rich data is 
generated through this method but it is exceptionally 
time-consuming, thus the typical sample size for these 
studies is small. For comparison, Hall and Hofer (1993) 
conducted 16 verbal protocol interviews, Zacharakis and 
Meyer (1995) conducted 4 such interviews and Mason 
and Stark (2004) conducted 9 interviews with VCs. 
Additionally, Chiu and Shu (2010) found that the typical 
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sample size of verbal protocols for problem-solving 
studies is between 1 and 20 which also confirms that the 
sample size in this study is at the higher end for this type 
of methodology. Finally given that data captured in real-
time from GVC investors is especially hard to obtain, the 
sample in this study contains important information on 
GVC investors.
Data collection procedure
Verbal protocol analysis consists of real-time observation 
during which researchers record the subject’s thinking 
and decision-making processes. During the phase of 
observation and recording, investment managers read 
a business plan sent by startup entrepreneurs while 
articulating their critical thoughts and impressions. The 
procedure for conducting a verbal protocol is formed of the 
following stages outlined by Ericsson and Simon (1993):
1.  Before the start of the experiment, it should be 
made clear to subjects that they must continuously 
articulate their thoughts explicitly during the 
experiment, including anything that comes to mind. 
If the subjects are silent for more than 30 seconds, 
the researcher must remind them to continue 
articulating their thoughts. 
2.  Before the start of the experiment, it is advised to 
conduct a test run by for example solving an easy 
mathematical problem. The researcher can ask the 
subject to perform a simple arithmetic addition task 
but to express every emerging thought clearly while 
performing the task. Hence the subject can receive 
some experience of the method before the start of 
the experiment. 
3.  Perform the verbal protocol experiment and audio 
record the narrative.
4.  Transcribe the recordings to commence the analysis.
This authorship team strived to follow closely these 
principles. Special consideration was made in regard to 
business plans evaluated by the investment managers. 
Providing each participant with the same business plans 
poses various problems. For example, if an investment 
manager reads the business plan of a startup that doesn’t 
fit his or her industry and life-cycle specialization, 
then the investment proposal will most probably be 
rejected outright. Another problem is that business plans 
provided by the researchers tend to decrease the practical 
validity of the research. However, if VCs are asked to 
read and evaluate business plans they themselves 
received, then these problems generally do not emerge, 
and the validity of the study is greatly enhanced 
(Zacharakis & Meyer, 1995). While being aware that 
giving the investors the same business plans would 
have increased the comparability of results, the benefits 
of evaluating actually received real business plans far 
outweigh the costs (Zacharakis & Meyer, 1995). Verbal 
protocol analysis is an adept tool for examining decision 
scenarios, provided that the following criteria are met as 
drawn from Ericsson and Simon (1993) and which took 
place in this study as outlined in Table 1. 
Table 1.
The implementation of verbal  
protocol analysis criteria
Criteria Implementation in our research
The information report-
ed must be the focus of 
attention
Each interview was made in an un-
disturbed, silent, closed office room 
with only the interview subjects and 
researchers present.Subjects are free from 
distraction
The task is not highly 
routinized by habit
Real business plans from various 
industries were used.
There must be only 
a short time between 
performance and verbal-
ization
Subjects continuously articulated 
their thoughts out loud during eva-
luation of the business plan and 
were reminded to continue articula-
ting their thoughts after being silent 
for 30 seconds. 
Verbalization does not 
require excessive en-
coding
The subjects articulated their own 
thoughts as they came to mind.
Reports are oral Oral interviews were conducted 
personally
Instructions are clear At the beginning of each interview, 
clear explanations were given on the 
method and the aim of the study.
Completeness in report-
ing is encouraged
Each business plan evaluation was 
completed
Source: own editing
Data analysis procedure
Firstly, the verbal protocol recordings were transcribed. 
In the transcribed text the so-called ‘thought segments’ 
were identified, which may be words, partial sentences, 
or complete sentences representing a coherent and distinct 
thought unit. To arrive at measurable results, each thought 
segment should be coded into a qualitative property or 
category, the importance of which was needed to measure 
investment decisions. Following  rationale set out in 
previous studies (Hall & Hofer, 1993; Mason & Stark, 
2004; Robinson, 1987; Zacharakis & Meyer, 1995, 1998), 
categories were drawn to answer the research question 
(see Table 2). The financial category mainly contains 
comments on the financial section of the business plan 
consisting of the planned revenue and cost structure, 
capital expenditures, and cash-flows. This financial plan 
is required in all three life-cycle stages. Additionally, it 
contains insights on the investment manager’s view of 
exit possibilities in for example prospective buyers of a 
company and its possible value given that based on mental 
calculations company valuations are not required in such 
financial plans. Deductive coding was used meaning 
whereby the range of qualitative indicators used as 
categories can be increased with the discovery of thought 
segments which do not fit into predefined categories (Cho 
& Lee, 2014).  
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Table 2. 
Qualitative properties used as categories
Management previous entrepreneurial experience of the 
management team 
education level of the management team
presence of core competencies
Product / Ser-
vice
innovational value of the product or service
readiness level of the product or service
appearance of the product or service
Market growth potential, scalability
saturation of the market, entry barriers
Business plan depth of the business plan
level of professionalism of the business plan 
Financials financial plan (revenue and cost structure, 
capital expenditures, cash-flows)
company value 
exit-opportunities
Positive exter-
nalities
job creation
regional development
sustainability
positive social impact
Source: own editing
Each thought segment was successfully linked to one of the 
categories defined above. On this basis, frequency tables 
for results were created for each type of GVC investor 
(pre-seed, seed, and expansion) to identify differences 
between the most relevant qualities of a startup’s business 
plan across the different life-cycle stages. The use of 
frequency tables is standard practice when conducting 
verbal protocol analysis and it is present in numerous 
studies examining investment preferences (for example, 
Hall & Hofer, 1993; Mason & Stark, 2004; Smith et al., 
2010). 
As with all other research methods, verbal protocol 
analysis has limitations. These include the possibility 
of frequency counts of thought units not completely 
representing the importance of the preference criteria 
because the participant may mention a particular point 
multiple times due to not being certain while he/she may 
only mention another point once when he/she is absolutely 
certain. Additionally, even though it is a real-time data-
collection method tool the experiment-like nature of 
verbal protocol interviews might also distort the behavior 
of the subject (Mason & Stark, 2004).
Results
The frequency of qualities assessed by the GVCs in general 
and across the three types of investors is very revealing. 
Each GVC investor type (pre-seed, seed, and expansion) 
evaluated six different startup business plans and their 
thought segments were linked to six categories: financial 
indicators, market, product and service, management 
team, business plan, and positive externalities. In Table 3 
frequencies of thought segments in each category in total 
and per life-cycle stage can be observed.
Table 3.
Frequency table of investment preferences based  
on verbal protocol analysis
Category Frequency (%) across the life-cycle stages 
Pre-seed Seed Expansion Total
Financial 
indicators
25,4% 31,8% 27,5% 28,4%
Market 21,9% 25,8% 21,4% 23,3%
Product and 
service
21,9% 23,7% 21,4% 22,5%
Management 
team
23,7% 13,0% 15,4% 17,5%
Business plan 7,1% 5,7% 14,3% 8,2%
Source: own database
Figure 3.
Overall investment preference hierarchy based on 
verbal protocol analysis 
Source: own database
Overall examination of results reveals that GVC 
investors valued financial indicators of the company 
most highly (28,4%), followed by the market (23,3%). 
This is completely opposite to preferences of PVC 
investors, who generally mostly value the market 
followed by financial indicatorss (Zacharakis & 
Shepherd, 2005; Mason & Stark, 2004; Shepherd, 1999). 
This result does not support hypothesis H1a stating that 
GVC investors mostly overall value the market followed 
by the financial indicators of the target company. The 
reason behind this can be in very strict state oversight 
which GVCs operate under, thereby requiring them 
to closely follow financial guidelines when selecting 
target companies. The market and product/service are 
almost equally important in the evaluation process. 
The high ranking of the product/service category is 
interesting because there is evidence in the literature 
that VCs do not value this factor highly. For example, 
Mason and Stark (2004) found it to be one of the least 
valued characteristics. A possible reason behind this 
coalesces with hypothesis H1b: “Overall GVC investors 
value the innovational value of the product highly 
within the product/service category”. It emerged that 
the contribution of observations on the innovational 
value of the product form a large portion of the total 
observations on the product, as seen in the Figure 4.
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Figure 4.
Share of innovation-related observations within 
the product and service category based on verbal 
protocol analysis
Source: own database
It is also notable that the GVCs discuss the innovational 
value of the product relative to all product-related 
observations mostly in the pre-seed phase (40% share), 
and less in the later phases (seed: 31% share, expansion: 
23% share). This may be due to less market validation 
information available about the company in the earliest 
phases which places more responsibility on the VC to 
determine if there are innovational properties in the 
product or not. Innovation is already market-tested in 
expansion stage companies, thus there is less need for 
analysis. Overall, this outcome supports hypothesis H1b. 
Combining the two findings that (1) the GVC places a 
large emphasis on the quality of the product/service and 
(2) within the product/service category, analysis of the 
innovational value makes up a large portion. It is therefore 
found that the GVC investor values the innovational value 
of the product most highly. 
In terms of overall ranking, quality of the business 
plan (8,2%) attains the lowest level of importance. Thus, 
startup entrepreneurs seeking state investment should be 
aware that their companies should have very good financial 
prospects to receive funding. In the following sections, the 
results of the three investment phases are analyzed, where 
some variation may arise.
Pre-seed
To identify qualities sought by GVC investors in pre-seed 
ventures results of pre-seed GVC verbal protocols are 
examined. Surprisingly, the most discussed criterion of 
the pre-seed GVC investors was again found in financial 
characteristics of the company (25,4%), closely followed 
by the management team (23,7%). However, management 
was the most discussed factor by  pre-seed GVC investors 
when compared with others (seed: 13%, expansion: 15,4%) 
(Figure 5.). 
Hypothesis 2a proposes that in the pre-seed phase 
GVCs mostly value qualities of the management team, 
similarly to angel investors. This hypothesis is partly 
supported since the management team formed the highest 
valued characteristic compared to other investment 
phases, but it was not the most absolutely highest category 
valued in the pre-seed phase. The issue of planned equity 
shares of key players is also relevant in the life-cycle stage. 
The importance of the financial indicators suggests that 
GVCs place strong emphasis on profitability and return 
potential of a startup even in infancy stage. Within this 
category, GVCs gave special attention to the composition 
of the equity holders. The GVCs placed equal emphasis 
on the market and the product consideration (21,9% in 
both cases). These are still relatively high weights, and 
several business plans were criticized for lack of diligent 
market analysis, especially regarding the identification 
of competitors. In some cases, the gathering of market 
feedback was strongly appreciated. In terms of the product, 
GVCs seemed to focus most on the innovational value, as 
in “we are looking for something that hasn’t been done a 
million times before”. Innovativeness was also shown to 
be a key driver of entrepreneurial growth by Czyżewska 
et al. (2016). 
Figure 5.
Pre-seed stage and overall investment preference 
hierarchy based on verbal protocol analysis 
Source: own database
Evidence of pre-seed GVC investment managers operating 
according to an entirely different preference structure 
than PVC investors was also noted. Financial indicators 
of the company are seen as the most important quality 
in a startup application for funding followed closely by 
that of the management team. The importance of the 
management team in this phase resembles the investment 
preference of angel investors (Hsu et al., 2014; Mason & 
Stark, 2004). This is most likely because in the pre-seed 
phase where angel investors are also active, investors 
should base their decision on the perceived capabilities 
of the management, as in this very early phase there is 
little verifiable information available about a given project 
thus leading to informational asymmetry. This renders the 
importance GVCs place on the financial indicators of the 
company in the pre-seed phase as even more surprising, 
thus hypothesis H2b “In the pre-seed phase, the financial 
indicators of the company are among the least valued 
characteristics by the GVC investor” is not supported. 
Hence the prior explanation that GVC investors spend 
the resources of the state is strengthened in that their 
accountability is elevated and their investment decision 
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is supported by the estimated financial indicators of the 
business plans. This finding is common to all three life-
cycle stages. 
The qualities attached to the structure and flow of the 
business plan were under minimal scrutiny in the pre-
seed category (7,1%), thus strong support for hypothesis 
h2c proposing that in the pre-seed phase the quality of the 
business plan is one of the least valued characteristics was 
evident. This is understandable since at this early stage, 
the length of the required plan tends to be much shorter 
than in later stages.
Seed
Qualities sought in seed ventures by GVC investors are 
examined in this section. The most scrutinized factor is 
once again clearly that of the financial indicators (31,8%). 
The financial plan, especially in terms of the price and 
cost structure is the subject of most criticism (Figure 6.). 
Figure 6.
Seed stage and overall investment preference 
hierarchy based on verbal protocol analysis
Source: own database
Since financial criteria of the seed stage startup phase 
tend to be more valuable than in the pre-seed stage it is 
understandable that a detailed financial plan for the near 
future becomes a more significant criterion. However, 
it is still very hard to forecast because of a lack of 
substantial historical data. The other two main factors 
in the seed investments consisted of the market (25,8%) 
and the product (23,7%) with the management team (13%) 
and business plan (5,9%) forming the least important 
categories. It was very interesting to note the management 
team factor achieving such low importance in the seed 
stage. This resembles findings of prior verbal protocol 
studies (for example Hall & Hofer, 1993; Zacharakis & 
Meyer, 1995; Mason & Stark, 2004) on VC investment 
preference indicators given it is also suggested to be in 
stark contrast to previous post-hoc studies by Tyebjee and 
Bruno (1984), Macmillan et al., (1987), Robinson (1987) 
and Khan (1987). However, hypothesis 3a, proposing 
that GVC investors mostly value the market followed by 
financial indicators in the seed stage can not be supported. 
This hypothesis was formed by assuming GVCs follow 
the investment preference structure of PVCs in the seed 
and expansion stage but also place a higher emphasis on 
the business plan than PVC investors. In contrast, results 
in this study indicate that GVCs value financial indicators 
the most, followed by the market which further confirms 
high regard given to financial indicators by GVCs, 
suggesting the need to follow a strict financial evaluation 
process in selecting target companies, in order to comply 
with state regulations. Quality of the business plan was 
the least valued characteristic (5,9%), therefore hypothesis 
H3b proposing that the business plan is in the top three 
characteristics in the seed phase can not be supported. 
This essentially implies that GVCs are free to place more 
emphasis on the factors that are important in regard to the 
business and there is little need to scrutinize the business 
plan structure, which is also very consistent with the 
manners in which PVCs tend to value this characteristic. 
Hence it can be concluded that the state-controlled nature 
of GVCs materializes in their focus on the financial 
prospects of the business plan and not upon the structure 
and general quality of the business plan. This is another 
finding that startup entrepreneurs might bear in mind 
when applying for GVC financing. 
Expansion
Figure 7.
Expansion stage and overall investment preference 
hierarchy based on verbal protocol analysis 
Source: own database
Qualities GVC investors seek in expansion-stage ventures 
are examined forthwith. Results of expansion stage 
evaluations resemble those of the seed stage in the sense 
that the financial indicators of the company are deemed the 
most important (27,5%), followed by the market (21,4%). 
However in this case the product or service holds the same 
importance as the market (21,4%) (Figure 7.). 
Similarly to previous results, this finding does not 
support hypothesis 4a, proposing that GVC investors 
mostly value the market followed by the financial indicators 
of the target company in the expansion stage. However, 
construction of the business plan (14,3%) has much higher 
importance in this phase compared to other phases which 
can be attributed to the business plans being the longest 
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at this life-cycle stage. Hence there is more opportunity 
to criticize their structure and flow, but hypothesis H4b is 
not supported since the business plan is not in the top three 
most valued characteristics. Thus, entrepreneurs applying 
for expansion stage GVC financing should devote more 
resources to competent construction of the business plan 
compared to the earlier stages. However they still can 
expect to receive relatively little criticism related to the 
quality of the business plan. The Table 4. contains results 
associated with the hypotheses.
Demonstration of the main criticisms of investment 
managers on the product, market, management team, 
financial indicators, and business plan structure of 
startup companies and formulation of advice on how 
to better write a business plan is another significant 
contribution of this paper. Based on observations of 
investment managers, it is advised that introduction to 
the product or service should begin with identification 
of the main market based problem to be addressed 
for which the product or service proposes a solution. 
Entrepreneurs should also double-check to ensure their 
product does hold innovational value, or merely imitates 
that of competitors. Finally by entrepreneurs only 
revealing positive aspects of their products or services 
investment managers can be significantly deterred. 
Hence attention to the shortcomings of products or 
services is essential. 
The business plan should indicate that there is market 
demand for the product or service of the startup company 
verified by market data and by user feedback. This aspect 
is generally required even in pre-seed business plans 
but is greatly emphasized in the seed and expansion 
stages. In the latter two stages, additional information 
is required for the market study which should be mostly 
based on publicly available data related to the size and 
tendencies of the market, the market share and pricing 
power of market participants, and the plan to capture a 
targeted share of the market. The business plan should 
follow a coherent structure and style and should be as 
concise, factual and straightforward as possible and 
preferably present data through graphical means. Use of 
‘buzzwords’ should be avoided. Ideally, the plan should 
follow the structure laid out in the executive summary. 
Additionally, pre-seed startup plans should also contain 
references to support their major propositions. 
The management team should contain essential 
core competencies required for the success of a startup 
company. Furthermore, team members in possession of 
core competencies should be significant shareholders of 
the firm. The aim should be to avoid larger competitors 
luring away key employees to notionally guarantee that 
key players of a startup company will support the success 
of the business in the long run.  For this reason, founders 
should carefully consider the distribution of equity 
between key management team members. Furthermore, 
startup management teams should show “great passion 
and enthusiasm” for their project and should be able to 
dedicate the majority of their time to it. 
The most important financial requirement is that of 
‘scalability’. If a startup company is not scalable, then the 
VC is typically unable to make a subsequent profitable 
exit because growth of the business is limited. For this 
reason, it is generally much harder for companies with 
a physical product to convince the VC to invest, while 
technological startups tend to be favored for VC financing. 
However, even technological startups tend not to receive 
VC financing if for example advertising revenues are 
their sole form of planned income. In either regard, 
startup companies should carefully design the part of 
the financial plan relating to sales growth. This should 
Table 4.
Result table for hypotheses
Hypothesis Supported Partly supported Not supported
H1a Overall, GVC investors value the market the most followed by 
financial indicators of target companies. X
H1b Overall GVC investors value the innovational value of the product 
highly within the product/service category. X
H2a In the pre-seed phase, the management of the target company is 
among the most valued characteristics by the GVC investor. X
H2b In the pre-seed phase, the financial indicators of the company are 
among the least valued characteristics by the GVC investor. X
H2c In the pre-seed phase, the business plan of the company is among the 
least valued characteristics by the GVC investor. X
H3a In the seed phase, the GVC investor values the market the most 
followed by the financial indicators of the target company. X
H3b In the seed phase, the GVC investor values the business plan of the 
target company among the top three characteristics. X
H4a In the expansion phase, the GVC investor values the market the most 
followed by the financial indicators of the target company. X
H4b In the expansion phase, the GVC investor values the business plan of 
the target company among the top three characteristics. X
Source: own database
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be based on publicly available data in order to convince 
VCs that startups are indeed capable of achieving targeted 
sales growth or capturing the targeted market share in the 
timeframe specified. Listing parties potentially interested 
in future acquisition of a startup can help indicate to VCs 
the potential exit possibilities, thus ‘sweetening the deal’.  
Conclusions
This article has examined differences in investment 
preferences across three distinct investment categories 
of Hungarian GVC investors in the pre-seed, seed, and 
expansion life-cycle stages by conducting three verbal 
protocol interviews in each resulting in 18 interviews in 
total. All investment managers evaluated two business 
plans from their portfolio consisting of the best and the 
worst. Each interview lasted for one hour and took place 
in undisturbed circumstances. Regarding selection of 
investment managers, a quota sampling method was used 
combined with reputation-based sampling to achieve 
maximum generalizability in each life-cycle stage. 
Through the use of verbal protocol analysis the actual 
investment screening procedure of the GVC in real-time 
could be captured. This eliminates recall bias associated 
with earlier post-hoc studies, which essentially based 
conclusions on VCs’ potentially flawed recollection of 
their previous investment choices. Another issue related 
to such studies is that of post-hoc rationalization thereby 
causing individuals to produce reasons to justify their prior 
decisions. Although verbal protocol analysis has its own 
inherent limitations, most prominently in the relatively 
low number of verbal protocols that can be reasonably 
conducted, it is still widely used compared with conjoint 
analysis to examine VC investment decisions.  
It was found that in overall terms GVCs mostly 
valued the financial indicators of the company. This was 
followed by the market and the product criteria in the seed 
and expansion stages. Generally in the literature, PVC 
investors value the market above financial indicators in 
direct contradiction to findings in this study. This is due 
to considerable state oversight placed on GVC investors 
required to follow statutory financial requirements when 
choosing investments. In the seed and expansion stages, 
the management team was not considered as an essential 
aspect of evaluations, but was more important than 
construction of the business plan. Management accorded 
a relatively low priority indicates resemblance to findings 
of previous real-time studies on PVC investment decisions 
(Hall & Hofer, 1993; Zacharakis & Meyer, 1995; Mason & 
Stark, 2004). In the pre-seed stage, the situation is starkly 
different in that the most important aspects of examined 
startup companies were still the financial indicators 
closely followed by that of the management team. High 
importance of the management team can be attributed 
to a lack of operational history. Investment managers 
should therefore base decisions more on the capabilities 
of management rather than the business idea or financial 
data when a business plan is relatively short. Ultimately in 
the early stage, the management should convince the VC 
that they can fully realize potential of the startup venture. 
Essentially in this stage, the GVC also adopts some 
characteristics of angel investors particularly a preference 
for a credible management team (Hsu et al., 2014; Mason 
& Stark, 2004), while maintaining the highest regard 
for financial indicators of the company, which is the 
most important quality that GVCs seek in every life-
cycle stage. Quality of the business plan formed the least 
important quality in all three life-cycle stages, which is 
consistent with the value PVCs place on it (Hall & Hofer, 
1993; Zacharakis & Meyer, 1995; Mason & Stark, 2004). 
It was also found that GVCs place great emphasis on the 
innovational value of the product or service of the target 
company which is greatest in the pre-seed phase. This is 
consistent with the aims of the governmental program that 
contributed funds for GVCs to invest in. 
This article has presented information on the 
investment preferences of governmental venture capital 
investment managers in three different life-cycle stage 
specialization  categories. Startup companies seeking 
funding will moreover be able to locate information on 
what to do and what to avoid in formation of the business 
plan. The main limitation of this study lies in focus on 
the Hungarian venture capital market. Other researchers 
should be encouraged to also use verbal protocol analysis to 
examine governmental venture capitalists in their country 
of origin. This would assist in identifying geographical 
and temporal characteristics in a still a relatively under-
researched field. Additional possible research questions 
may include addressing evaluation of pitch presentations 
by GVC investors, and the type of support entrepreneurs 
may expect from GVC investment other than financial 
support on the basis of metrics which GVC investors use 
to evaluate success of their investments.
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